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Scott Nearing’s resignation from the University of Toledo in March 1917 
marked the beginning of a transformation in his life. For the second time in two 
years the 34-year-old economist relinquished a teaching position on account of 
political and philosophical differences with his employers. After being fired from 
the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School in 1915 for attacking industrial 
America’s exploitive child labor practices and then asked to leave Toledo two 
years later because of his anti-preparedness stance, Nearing was essentially 
excommunicated from academia. Embittered by his pariah status and standing at a 
crossroads—jobless, an opponent of international violence under any 
circumstance, and increasingly socialistic in thinking—he embarked upon a 
campaign to expose the “hypocrisy” of America’s industrial-capitalist 
establishment and its role in implicating the U.S. in a war of European 
imperialism. Nearing once wrote that his expulsion from academia allowed him to 
pursue “a new and larger field, a study of human society, its assumptions, 
principles, responsibilities, and practices,” pushing him “unceremoniously onto a 
new level of social usefulness.”1 His trenchant views on capitalism and war 
propelled him to the forefront of the peace movement and the Socialist Party, while 
simultaneously earning him the scorn of liberal elites. Nearing’s battle with 
America’s privileged classes profoundly altered the course of “radical” activity in 
the U.S. during World War I and left a lasting impression on the country’s 
intellectual, political and social culture. 
 Surprisingly, Nearing’s personal odyssey during World War I has not been 
fully treated, and for the most part he is viewed both as an ancillary and divisive 
figure within the anti-war movement and as having only a minor influence on the 
                                                 
1 Scott Nearing, The Making of a Radical: A Political Autobiography (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 136. 
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movement as a whole.2 Two biographies offer insight into his involvement with 
peace groups and socialism during this period. Stephen J. Whitfield’s narrative 
focuses generally on Nearing’s public activism during the war, locating it within 
the larger “travail of dissent” of the twentieth century, and John Saltmarsh’s more 
focused and comprehensive study addresses Nearing’s philosophical roots and 
intellectual growth, while also tactfully balancing his “central incongruity” as both 
“public intellectual” and “private thinker.”3 Neither of these studies, however, 
effectively engages his substantial role in fomenting anti-establishment values 
among socialists, intellectuals, students, and workers. The biographies faithfully 
reconstruct the spirit of Nearing’s contributions as an agitator and a radical, but fail 
to capture the significance of his leadership within both the anti-war and socialist 
movements. As a supplement to these studies, what is needed is an analysis of 
Nearing’s discursive and oratorical method and its impact on uniting radical 
activity during the pivotal war years.  
Known among liberal academics as a scholarly maverick, Scott Nearing 
carved out a reputation as a staunch proponent of working-class values before the 
war, earning “him the enmity of powerful interests in the financial and industrial 
world.”4 Nearing’s radicalism developed rapidly after Woodrow Wilson’s 
November 4, 1915 proclamation directing the nation to support military 
preparedness. Throughout 1916 and early 1917, he wrote and spoke openly about 
the proclamation’s contradictions. He asked how the United States could call itself 
a neutral country and at the same time arm for the war and provide munitions to 
countries already participating in the bloodshed. He also appealed to workers 
directly, asking them what gains they stood to reap by supporting American 
industrial production for a war overseas, other than enabling widespread death and 
devastation. In a keynote address at a meeting of the Central Labor Union of 
Toledo, Nearing reminded his audience that, “The American people are committed 
people who do America’s work. The people, as a whole, do not want war. Should 
                                                 
2 See for instance C. Roland Marchand, The American Peace Movement and Social Reform, 1898-1918 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1972); and Charles Chatfield, “World War I and the Liberal Pacifist in the United 
States,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 75 (7) (Dec., 1970), 1920-1937. Even when placed at the front of the 
peace movement, Nearing’s ideas and actions emerge only in partial light. The best example of this is in Frank 
Grubbs’s study on the struggle for working-class support waged between pacifists and the Samuel Gompers-led 
American Federation of Labor. In this account, Nearing’s involvement with the People’s Council of America for 
Democracy and Terms of Peace overshadows the diverse range of tactics he pursued in publicizing an anti-war 
message, linking the war to imperialist forces, and forging relationships with American wage-workers. Frank L. 
Grubbs, Jr., The Struggle for Labor Loyalty: Gompers, the AFL, and the Pacifists, 1917-1920 (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1968). 
3 Stephen J. Whitfield, Scott Nearing: Apostle of American Radicalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1974), vii; John Saltmarsh, Scott Nearing: an Intellectual Biography (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 
1. 
4 The Philadelphia North American, June 18, 1915. 
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we fight for the capitalist traders? So much the greater fools, we.”5 Nearing also 
made an explicit connection between Wilson’s call for preparedness and 
Germany’s blockade of armaments to England, the United States’ biggest 
customer:  
When England declared a blockade of Germany, American business said to 
John Bull: ‘It’s all right, we’ll sell to you.’ Now that Germany has 
threatened to do the same to England we are in danger of losing our market 
for munitions and are on the verge of war. It looks as if J.P. Morgan and Co. 
stands to lose their [sic] big bet on England to win the war and we must step 
in to help them win. If we go into this war it will be to make money…6 
 
His critique of war as a capitalist conspiracy strengthened a fast growing domestic 
peace coalition that became gradually focused on eradicating two root causes of 
war: greed and ineffectual diplomacy.  
Socialists such as Randolph Bourne, William English Walling, and John 
Reed contended that the fundamental cause of the war could be found in the 
conflict of economic interests. Walling, a moderate socialist, chastised “bourgeois 
pacifism” practiced by liberal progressives like Jane Addams. He argued that 
Addams’s Woman’s Peace Party, one of the earliest pacifist organizations, failed to 
consider “the great task that lies before us, namely, to find a way either in the near 
future or ultimately to bring the conflict of national economic interests to an end.”7 
The so-called “bourgeois pacifists” argued, on the other hand, that in order to 
achieve peace a robust diplomatic internationalism must work to stem the tide of 
militaristic behavior mounting in Europe. For example, Walter Lippmann, an 
editor of The New Republic, argued that “the important point is that there should be 
in existence permanent international commissions to deal with those spots of the 
earth where world crises originate…such international governing bodies are 
needed wherever the prizes are great, the territory unorganized, and the 
competition active.”8 Technical criticisms aside, socialists were in fact able to 
collaborate successfully with bourgeois pacifists prior to American involvement in 
the war. As Thomas Knock writes, many socialists and liberals “regarded 
reactionary opponents of domestic reform and the advocates of militarism and 
                                                 
5 Toledo Blade, February 14, 1917. 
6 Ibid., February 14, 1917. 
7 William E. Walling, “Socialists and Imperialism,” in Towards and Enduring Peace: A Symposium of Peace 
Proposals and Programs, 1914-1916, complied by Randolph Bourne (New York: Garland Publishing, 1916), 34. 
8 Walter Lippmann, “The Problem of Diplomacy,” in Towards and Enduring Peace: A Symposium of Peace 
Proposals and Programs, 1914-1916, complied by Randolph Bourne (New York: Garland Publishing, 1916), 32. 
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imperialism as twins born of the same womb,” and to combat these insidious 
forces, they responded by combining their powers of protest.9  
The formation of the American Union Against Militarism (AUAM) in 
January 1916 resulted directly from Wilson’s preparedness speech given in 
November of the previous year, and represented one such collaborative effort 
between socialists and bourgeois pacifists. The AUAM declared its intention to 
“throw…a monkey wrench into the machinery of preparedness and to stop the war 
through a conference of neutrals…”10 C. Roland Marchand notes that the AUAM 
at this time also began perpetuating the idea that “the battle between the people’s 
interests and the entrenched special interests…was now being reenacted in the 
struggle over military preparedness and war.”11 Although not affiliated with the 
AUAM at this point, Nearing held similar beliefs about linking preparedness to 
“profit-hungry” capitalists. In Poverty and Riches, published in the fall of 1916, he 
concluded that, “as long as industry is being run for profit, the dollar will be put 
above the man. Grant the truth of this assertion and it becomes apparent that there 
is a fundamental conflict between the principle of democracy and the present 
system of industry for profit.”12 He also delivered a series of lectures that fall in 
which he questioned why “The American people are being urged to ‘prepare.’ Is it 
preparation for peace or preparation for war?”13 Like many Americans, Nearing 
and the members of the AUAM were confused as to Wilson’s motivations in 1916.  
World events moved at a break-neck pace in the first several months of 1917 
and the picture became much clearer to socialists and pacifists: the American 
people were indeed being prepared for war. Irrespective of Wilson’s speech to the 
Senate on January 22, 1917, calling for a “peace without victory,” many socialists 
believed that the United States had already become too involved not to be drawn 
into the war. As the prominent New York socialist Morris Hillquit recalled, “as the 
war went on the ‘neutrality of thought’ was gradually abandoned in certain 
quarters, and voices began to be heard, speculating on the possibility of American 
participation. It is undoubtedly true that the change of sentiment was largely 
induced by the business interests…more and more entangled in allied arms.”14 
Hillquit did not deny German intransigence as a genuine cause of war, but as a 
socialist, he could not accept unabated capitalist profiteering at the expense of 
millions of lives. Thus, the fundamental conflict between socialist-pacifism and 
                                                 
9 Thomas J. Knock, “Wilson’s Battle for the League: Progressive Internationalists Confront the Forces of Reaction,” 
in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations Vol. I: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill and Thomas Patterson 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 565.  
10 Quoted in Marchand, The American Peace Movement and Social Reform, 1898-1918, 241-42. 
11 Ibid., 244. 
12 Scott Nearing, Poverty and Riches: A Study of the Industrial Regime (Philadelphia: John C. Winston, 1916), 255. 
13 Nearing, The Making of a Radical, 110. 
14 Morris Hillquit, Loose Leaves from a Busy Life (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), 162-63. 
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bourgeois or progressive pacifism was set. Wilson’s disciples, in general, found 
aggressive militarism to be the most unsavory and dangerous aspect of the world 
conflict. For this reason, they accepted his decree of February 26 to begin 
preparation for “armed neutrality” and his April 2 decision to put the nation on a 
footing for war. Socialists argued that Wilson had been duped by “big business,” 
(even as German submarines sunk American ships) and they stood steadfast in 
their position that the pursuit of peace could be the only objective.  
The two years of hospitable relations that existed between socialists and 
liberals ended on April 6, 1917, when the U.S. entered the war. Many prominent 
progressives, including The New Republic editors Lippman and Herbert Croly, the 
historian Charles Beard, and the journalist Walter Weyl, abandoned their 
commitment to the peace movement, believing that German militarism posed too 
great a threat to ignore. Moderate socialists, such as Walling, Upton Sinclair, 
Charles Edward Russell, and John Spargo also abandoned the cause. This left the 
American pacifist movement fragmented and disorganized. To save itself from 
disintegration, the movement, which had become increasingly militant in its outcry 
against war since the beginning of 1917, turned east to Russia for guidance. In 
spite of considerable instability within their country, the Russians took a step 
toward democracy in March 1917 with the dissolution of Czar Nicholas’s regime. 
Although still participating in the war, an estimated one and a half million men had 
deserted their posts by the end of 1916.15  “New Russia,” for all intents and 
purposes, began moving toward its ideal plan—a negotiated peace and an 
immediate cessation to the hostilities. This plan alone offered hope to an American 
peace movement that was quickly being undermined by a sudden lack of support.  
March and April 1917 were transformational months on several levels for 
socialists and pacifists in America. From an international standpoint, the 
emergence of a democratic Russia set the stage for a clash of diverging claims to a 
new world order. The Americans determined that the only way to achieve 
meaningful peace was to stamp out militarism in all its virulent forms and to enter 
the fighting on the side of the allies. The Russians, urged by the allies to step up 
their waning military support, contended that only a peace-first attitude could cure 
the flare up of aggression and put an end to the hegemonic forces of war that 
“enslaved” the workers of the world. At the domestic level, both socialism and 
pacifism went from acceptable, indeed popular, movements to unpatriotic and 
subversive fringe movements. Reformer pacifists, such as Lillian Wald and Jane 
Addams (who, unlike Walling, held firm in their commitments to non-violence), 
and socialists were immediately targeted as radicals and forced to carry out their 
protests under the constant fear of repression. Finally, at the individual level 
                                                 
15 Lloyd Gardner, Wilson and Revolutions, 1913-1921 (Washington, D.C.: University of America Press, 1976), 24. 
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Americans were called upon to make a “sacrifice” and unquestioningly advocate 
war “to make the world safe for democracy.”16 Most were exasperated with 
Germany’s belligerence by March 1917, and like the President, felt that the time 
for peaceful negotiation had ended. Yet more than a mere handful of Americans 
argued that war at any cost violated the principles of democracy, enriched 
industrialist “tyrants,” and further oppressed the working classes. Apparently not 
enthralled with the socialist-pacifist challenge to establishment prerogative, 
Americans chose war overwhelmingly, and in the short span of two months the 
temperament of the nation changed from tolerant to intolerant and from 
conciliatory to confrontational. With the line between pacifist and socialist 
deliberately blurred by American patriots who lumped all “un-American” behavior 
together, radicals looked to one another for reinforcement, and eventually, in 
November 1917, to the Bolsheviks and their socialist revolution.   
Scott Nearing belonged to this latter group of Americans who thought that 
industrial “plutocrats” were largely responsible for plunging the nation into war. 
As a social scientist, Nearing tried to avoid being a “teacher with a doctrine,” 
someone who “was unable or unwilling to face new situations.” However, his 
mounting resentment for the war, for capitalism and for a careening world political 
situation allowed him to abandon previous fears of ideological rigidity; embracing 
socialism put him on a collision course with pro-war Wilsonian liberals.17 In a 
speech delivered to the Twentieth Century Club of Detroit, two weeks before 
joining the Socialist Party and just a few days before leaving his academic post for 
good, Nearing laid out the American crisis in stark economic terms: 
The six or ten millions of men who would be thrown out of employment by 
the cessation of the war, would rise in revolution against the government 
which is responsible for their unlucky lot, and to prevent the disruption of 
the government, President Wilson has taken the only other course: 
immediate participation in the present conflict.18 
 
By dispensing with a disinterested political posture, he freed himself to pursue an 
aggressive propaganda operation against the war. Two factors helped Nearing gain 
almost immediate notoriety within the anti-war movement: his oratorical skills and 
his ideas on education. In the first several months after the war, Nearing spoke 
publicly at a relentless pace. By his own estimation, he gave eight to ten lectures a 
week and up to four hundred a year during the war years.19 Secondly, Nearing 
came to the pacifist movement armed with a plan. Thematically, socialist ideals 
                                                 
16 Wilson uttered these famous words in a speech delivered to the Senate April 2, 1917. 
17 Nearing, The Making of a Radical, 145. 
18 Toledo Blade, March 10, 1917. 
19 Nearing, The Making of a Radical, 68. 
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pervaded his anti-war rhetoric, but he tactfully integrated those ideals to 
encompass a broad swath of dissenters, including pacifists (conscientious 
objectors), socialists, non-socialists, workers, and students. His plan centered on a 
grassroots infiltration of the masses, which called for the dissemination of an 
extensive network of propaganda—public speakers, pamphlets, leaflets, discussion 
groups, and educational training—around the country. Upon joining the Socialist 
Party, he also took a position on the executive committee of the AUAM, where he 
began making his ideas known to its acting director, Roger Baldwin, a founder of 
the American Civil Liberties Union. 
The most pressing goal for radicals after America entered the war was to 
quickly unite various individual pacifist groups that had been ravaged by a loss in 
membership. Many historians have pointed out that the movement suffered from 
too much diversity at the outset, which in the end foiled plans to reach a wide 
audience and harness momentum. Nearing, however, attempted to create a bridge 
for disparate interests to meet on common ground. Using his unique position as a 
hinge radical, moving fluidly between pacifist, socialist, and labor organizations, 
he advocated a program of inclusion whereby all three groups could articulate their 
grievances. When Vladimir Lenin wrote that “it is with ideas, not with armies, we 
shall conquer the world,” Nearing took it literally.20 During the war he encouraged 
opportunities for radicals to engage in meaningful resistance together, rather than 
in isolation from one another. He laid out a prescription for unified action in his 
contentious anti-war pamphlet The Great Madness, published shortly after the 
American entry into battle:  
The work of the people is cut out for them—cut out in all its stupendous 
importance. They must:—    
1. Continue to meet regularly and systematically for the discussion of 
vital questions. 
2. Publish a paper in every city that will be owned by the people and 
will represent them. 
3. Capture the schools. The school system is the greatest single asset 
now in the hands of the plutocracy. 
4. Establish industrial and political solidarity. 
5. Educate! Educate!! Everywhere and upon every possible occasion 
in home, shop, streetcar, meeting hall. 
6. Take out all profit out of industry. 
7. Guarantee and maintain equal opportunity and justice for all.21 
 
                                                 
20 Quoted in Scott Nearing, Violence or Solidarity? Or Will Guns Settle it? (New York: People’s Print, 1919), 1.  
21 Scott Nearing, The Great Madness: A Victory for the American Plutocracy (New York: The Rand School of 
Social Science, 1917), 44. 
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The directives issued here speak to Nearing’s desire for a general platform catering 
to broad segments of the movement. He believed that the only way to combat the 
federal government’s pro-war public relations assault was to counter it with an 
outpouring of propaganda that spoke collectively to these groups. 
Before assimilating competing philosophies and strategies, however, it was 
necessary to craft a formal rapprochement between the variant strains of pacifism. 
The bulk of the AUAM consisted of progressive pacifists who favored a program 
attentive to ending militarism. They were concerned mainly with changing the 
structure of international diplomacy, repealing the Conscription Act of May 18, 
1917, and ending the war on democratic terms. They did not want to become “a 
party of opposition” and emphasized that “we are not, by habit or temperament, 
troublemakers.”22 American socialists, on the other hand, were combative at the 
start of the war. Emboldened by the initial Russian experiment in self-government 
and growing Bolshevik representation in the Provisional Government, they stepped 
up their attacks on the “liberal-capitalist” establishment, demanding a platform for 
international industrial reform. Socialists differed in focus from progressive anti-
war demonstrators: the former wanted to attack the industrial elite, while the latter 
sought only to change existing diplomatic practices based on Real Politik. In 
addition to the concerns of the socialists and liberal-progressives —the two largest 
components of the peace movement—hundreds of smaller peace organizations 
made up of farmers, Christians, single-taxers, and local labor unions, each with 
their own agenda, threatened to be swallowed up by the great tide of patriotism 
sweeping the country. The problem was clear enough: unite or face extinction. 
The First American Conference of Democracy and Terms of Peace 
convened on May 30 and 31, 1917 at Madison Square Garden in New York City in 
front of 15,000 people.23 The conference aimed to bring together pacifists from all 
over the U.S. to discuss a program of unification. Led by Nearing, Louis Lochner 
and Rebecca Shelly, the latter two of the Emergency Peace Federation (EPF), 
planning for the conference began shortly after the American declaration of war. 
From the beginning, the moderate faction of the AUAM expressed its discontent 
with the strong socialist elements permeating the unification movement, which 
they argued only complicated the realistic goal of ending the war. As director of 
the organizing committee for the May conference, and a member of the American 
Union, Nearing defused the crisis with the simple suggestion that they pursue a 
more ecumenical program that joined forces to work “towards the establishment of 
                                                 
22 Quoted in Marchand, The American Peace Movement, 253. 
23 History and Organizational Information, People’s Council of America for Democracy and Peace, box 1 3:1, 
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industrial democracy in the United States after the war.”24 The use of the term 
“industrial democracy” became a catchphrase within the peace movement, 
meaning different things to different people. For socialists, it meant replacing the 
capitalist political economy with a system of collectivization in which the “social 
machinery” transferred from the individual capitalist to the hands of the American 
working people. For the pacifist unwilling to accept socialist doctrine, industrial 
democracy could mean simply working to improve upon current international labor 
standards. Manipulating the language and the terms of unification kept most 
moderates happy. While the AUAM withdrew from the conference, it remained on 
the bill as a supporting organization, and many of its more radical members joined 
up with its sister peace organization, the EPF. Nearing’s contribution to this first 
conference went well beyond two simple words, but nevertheless, these words 
were symbolic of his willingness to find middle ground for all groups to meet on.  
Out of the May conference grew a complete set of compromises that spoke 
to a national audience of peace groups. Although tension remained between 
radicals and moderates, they both agreed that for the time being the Russians had 
put together the most progressive peace plan. In the spirit of internationalism, they 
modeled their national peace organization after the Russian Council of Workmen’s 
and Soldiers’ Delegates, a faction sympathetic to the Bolsheviks that held a 
position of power within the Provisional Government. The moderates were able to 
accept the Russian plan without reservation because of its universally democratic 
language. Socialism had yet to make its revolutionary inroads in Russia, and, in 
fact, the Wilson administration still praised the country’s implementation of 
democratic principles (they also cheered Russia’s labors in hope that it would 
stimulate a renewed vigor for the allied war cause).  
The American pacifists called their organization the People’s Council of 
America, and their program advocated “an early, democratic and general peace in 
harmony with the principles of New Russia, namely: no forcible annexations, no 
punitive indemnities, [and] free development for all nationalities.” 25 Secondly, the 
Council urged substantive changes in the American approach to international 
diplomacy, as well as putting an end to the secret negotiation of treaties, 
conscription and the draft, the poor treatment of workers, and the curtailment of 
civil liberties. Finally, and most importantly, they called for peace through national 
referenda. The Council supported the opinions of its “constituents” in matters of 
international diplomacy and formulated “policy” after gauging their attitudes. If the 
                                                 
24 New York State Senate, Revolutionary Radicalism: Its History, Purpose and Tactics; Report of the Joint 
Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, Filed April 24, 1920, in the New York State Senate, Vol. I 
(Albany, New York: J.B. Lyon Company Printers, 1920), 1037. 
25 History and Organizational Information, People’s Council of America for Democracy and Peace, box 1 3:1, 
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American government failed to heed the voice of the people, the Council reasoned, 
then the only recourse would be to shift tactics from independent lobbying to mass, 
united action. The structure of the Council reflected that of the Russian “soviet” 
system, a flexible and decentralized body of state committees responsive to local 
council committees, but also had representation in the decision-making process at 
the national level of the organization. The national council acted as the chief 
generator of propaganda and education, providing uniformity to the pacifist 
message and direction to the massive alliance, which included, by June 1917, the 
full participation of the EPF, the Woman’s Peace Party, the American Legal 
Defense League, the American Association for Labor Legislation, the Non-Partisan 
League, the American Civil Liberties Bureau (bureau was changed to union shortly 
thereafter), hundreds of local labor unions, the Socialist Party, and the Socialist 
Labor Party.26  
From June through September 1917, Nearing served on the People’s Council 
executive committee in charge of labor agitation. His experience teaching 
economics made him the most qualified candidate to discuss in laymen’s terms the 
pressing crisis that war had thrust upon workers. During this period, he also taught 
full-time at the Rand School of Social Science in New York City and lectured 
extensively to national and local labor organizations around the country.27 As the 
war dragged on into the fall, he grew increasingly uncertain about the merits of 
moderation in the pacifist movement. His experience with organized labor soured 
him on the prospect of a peace-first plan geared toward ending militarism. In his 
mind, militarism flowered under the exigencies of capitalist domination. Faced 
with the difficult task of trying to undercut the activities of Samuel Gompers’ pro-
war and pro-capitalist American Alliance for Labor and Democracy, Nearing came 
to the conclusion that the People’s Council did not go far enough in providing a 
true alternative for workers. In order to obtain the socialist vision of industrial 
democracy, the terms of peace needed to be more closely tied to an anti-corporate 
agenda. In September 1917 he wrote, “Recent events lead me to the conclusion that 
it is not the diplomats who want the war to go on but the business interests.”28 
Nearing could no longer accept that militarism was due as much to diplomatic 
failure as it was due to plutocratic self-indulgence. This revelation is not in itself 
                                                 
26 New York State Senate, Revolutionary Radicalism: Its History, Purpose and Tactics, Vol. 1, 1024-1037. 
27 The Rand School was a workers’ institute, catering exclusively to the needs of the uneducated and immigrant 
populations of New York and was openly connected to the Socialist movement. The School sought to provide 
workers with the tools to help “free” them from the monotony of wage-work and to encourage them to take 
ownership in the socialist political movement. 
28 “Open Letters to Profiteers: An Arraignment of Big Business in Its Relation to World War,” Unpublished Letter 
to the editors of The New York Times, September 22, 1917, Scott Nearing Papers, SCPC [his emphasis]. Nearing 
wrote five letters to the editors of The New York Times, which were never published. Instead, they were used in 
pamphlet form by the People’s Council and distributed widely to local People’s Council branches for sale to the 
public.    
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startling when placed side-by-side with his philosophic economism—the belief in 
the primacy of economic causes—and the fact that radical socialist power in the 
Russian Provisional Government continued to gain momentum. His opinions grew 
even more strident as he assumed the chairmanship of the People’s Council upon 
Morris Hillquit’s departure in late September 1917.29 
Nearing’s accession to the top position on the People’s Council represents 
the culmination of his transformation from liberal economist to radical socialist. It 
also marked the beginning of a new experiment in radical activity for pacifists, 
prefiguring the leftward political surge the movement experienced through 1920.30 
Publicly Nearing professed a united front among pacifists, telling the socialist New 
York Call, “It is the business of the People’s Council to find those points of 
probable agreement and thus establish a common meeting ground, a clearing house 
for the liberal and the radical elements in American life.”31 Under his direction, 
however, the Socialist Party played a much larger role in formatting the agenda for 
peace than he led on. The language of socialism gradually crept into the Council’s 
bulletins, sent out weekly to its members across the country, and he stepped up the 
challenge to Gompers’s Alliance for Labor. Nearing fired a shot at the Alliance 
one day after assuming the chairmanship: “…The American People are opening 
their eyes…they know that the big business forces have been trying to suppress the 
revolutionary labor movement in this country, while they folded to their bosoms a 
little group of labor politicians who are using the occasion to ‘clean up’ on their 
opponents.”32 Nearing no doubt had Gompers in mind when writing this polemic. 
In order to meet the Alliance head on, he attempted to set the Council’s program 
on a higher moral ground. He wanted to establish the socialist-pacifist cause as the 
cause of working-class freedom, removed from the “degeneracy” spawned by 
industrial capitalism, and as striving toward a greater good—the institution of 
industrial democracy.  
The success of the Bolshevik Revolution lent credence to Nearing’s 
approach. Lenin and the Bolsheviks swept out of power the American-recognized 
Provisional Government led by Alexander Kerensky on November 7, 1917. Wilson 
                                                 
29 Hillquit served as chairman of the People’s Council until September, but left that position to concentrate full-time 
on his 1917 New York City mayoral bid. 
30 This rush of leftist sentiment was most evident at the voting booth. From the East Coast to the Midwest, socialist 
turnout hit record numbers in the 1917 municipal elections. In New York City, turnout reached its all-time peak–22 
percent of the city's voters chose socialists—and New Yorkers elected ten socialist assemblymen, seven alderman, 
and one municipal court judge. In Milwaukee, socialists elected seventeen assemblymen and five congressmen, and 
in Chicago and Cleveland, they each sent two socialists to the city council. Through 1920, socialists maintained 
record membership numbers, peaking at 120,000 during the 1920 election. Historians, such as Daniel Bell in 
Marxian Socialism in the United States, often relate this rise in socialist popularity to the war crisis, but it also seems 
plausible that pacifist and socialist propaganda and a mass education program were equally as important. 
31 New York Call, September 23, 1917. 
32 “Open Letters to Profiteers,” September 22, 1917, SCPC. 
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and other prominent American internationalists chafed at Lenin’s immediate calls 
for a negotiated peace between the European antagonists. When the Americans 
entered the war, they did so with the intent of crushing Prussian militarism. The 
Bolsheviks anti-war stance (consider rewording-awkward) and their decision to 
call back troops from the front lines at the end of 1917 thwarted this intention and 
raised fears of a possible conspiracy with the Central Powers. “The forces of 
movement” split into competing factions, with liberalism pitted squarely against 
revolutionary socialism.33 Both the Americans and Russians proclaimed their 
desire for peace, and in Wilson’s words, a “world made safe for democracy,” but 
each sought different means to achieve their goal of creating a new form of 
diplomacy.  
Nearing’s reaction to these complex geopolitical developments on the 
domestic front is important in two ways. First, the Russian political successes 
provided a convenient opening for Nearing to bolster his criticism of American 
war profiteering and to further a program of agitation that connected the war to 
working-class oppression. Shortly after the Bolshevik seizure of power he wrote 
that the “whole question of war profiteering” bears “directly upon the ‘economic 
rights’ of the American people and therefore fall[s] within the scope of the 
People’s Council program.”34 This statement conflicts with his earlier comments to 
the New York Call, in which he labeled the Council a “clearing house” for both 
radicals and liberals in America. Clearly, Nearing set out to separate the Council 
from the liberal program for peace by allying it with a Russian program that 
highlighted elements of class conflict. Secondly, the revolution legitimized the 
previous two decades of activity by American Socialists, augmenting domestic 
opposition to the Wilson Administration’s wartime policies. The historian Charles 
Chatfield points out that some “pacifists supported the revolution, too, because its 
peace planks accorded with their own demand for a ‘new diplomacy’ embodying 
democratic principles such as freedom of press, petition, and speech,” as well as a 
“progressive tax on war profits.”35 Even as the Council continued to ramp up its 
radicalism, some progressive pacifists remained loyal because they believed that 
the Russian peace program offered a legitimate, non-violent solution to the 
conflict. For dyed-in-the-wool pacifists, the Bolsheviks offered the most realistic 
plan for galvanizing worldwide support for democratic diplomacy, despite their 
socialist economic views. Although many pacifists, liberal or otherwise, did not 
                                                 
33  Arno J. Mayer, Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918 (New Haven: Yale Press, 1959), 1-14. Mayer 
develops his thesis around the political dialect between “the forces of order and the forces of movement.” He asserts 
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34 The Bulletin of the People’s Council of America, December 28, 1917, SCPC. 
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convert to socialism, they believed that the Russians honestly represented the 
people’s voice. Since the preparedness controversy in 1916, they no longer trusted 
Wilson to do the right thing. As Nation editor Oswald Garrison Villard remarked at 
the time, “I am utterly discouraged and shocked and have completely lost my faith 
in Wilson…I simply feel that he is no longer to be depended upon…”36  
Playing on this current of mistrust, in order to spread the word about the 
Bolshevik peace plan, Nearing redoubled his commitment to educating the 
American worker about the benefits of socialism. His teachings to student-workers 
at the Rand School, the International Fur Workers’ Union and the Amalgamated 
Clothing Workers’ Union in New York City played a significant role in developing 
a unified socialist educational method that attempted to undermine the 
effectiveness of Wilsonian internationalism.37 Supplementing his seven-pronged 
prescription for pacifist activism delineated in The Great Madness, Nearing 
injected into the cause specifically socialist aims patterned after the Russian 
Revolution. The goal became not simply civilized activism, working through 
proper bureaucratic channels for peace, but urgent and abrupt mass action modeled 
after the Bolsheviks. Nearing wanted to take the People’s Council’s momentum in 
to a new stage, and he found in socialist doctrine the political weapon with which 
to make immediate, rather than gradual change. By fusing the revolutionary tone of 
socialism to the program of peace laid out by the People’s Council, Nearing 
believed he could lift the masses upward toward change. Although he never 
explicitly advocated violent revolution, he did use the rhetoric of a revolutionary, 
as evidenced by this speech delivered to Rand School students in 1918:  
So while we rejoice that the Russian revolutionists are breaking economic 
chains; while we send out good wishes and cheer to the German 
revolutionists as they throw off autocracy and set up a government of the 
people, let us not forget that expressions of good cheer are not the things that 
the Russian and German workers want from us. They want from us a 
Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council in New York City. They want from us a 
Workers’ and Soldiers’ Government in the United States. When we have 
established government, we will have made good our claim to brotherhood 
and comradeship with the workers of Russia and Germany.38 
 
The People’s Council’s founders copied the structural configuration of the 
Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council, but they did not mention anything about using this 
system as an alternative to American democracy. Nearing, yet again, increased 
                                                 
36 Quoted in Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises, 1915-1916, Vol. IV, (Princeton: Princeton University 
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radical America’s challenge to liberal-capitalism. Peace for Nearing could only 
come with the end of exploitation, realized through socialism, and he continued to 
focus on cultivating a relationship with American workers.   
Although Nearing did not have a working-class background he sympathized 
with the plight of the oppressed. He valued work, he once said, because “Everyone 
who works—whether joyfully or joylessly—is creating a product that will benefit a 
fellowman.”39 Like Eugene Debs, the entrenched father of American socialism and 
the symbol of agrarian radicalism, he believed every working man and woman held 
the key to the future of the United States. Secondly, he understood the importance 
of appealing to the values of the commoner. He learned this latter skill from Debs. 
The former Indiana rail worker possessed an uncanny ability to empathize with his 
audience, making them feel that he was communicating “not to people, but for 
them.”40 The New York Call reported on a 1908 rally at Grand Central Station in 
New York in which Debs, who was not opposed to using biblical metaphor, uttered 
what are now famous lines: “You workingmen have heads. You are satisfied to use 
your hands in the interest of the fellows who are shrewd enough to use their heads. 
Let me remind you that you have heads as well as hands. And when you use both 
you will be masters of this earth.”41 Nearing employed similarly dramatic language 
throughout the war in effort to draw attention to economic injustices and “the ever 
widening chasm between those who possess and those who do not.”42 Whereas 
Debs spoke for the people, Nearing spoke about what happened to the people as a 
result of the capitalist’s “ill-gotten” war profits.  
Nearing’s consistent reaffirmation of purpose—connecting American 
business to the perpetuation of war and the disenfranchisement of the American 
worker—gave his discourse an uplifting quality, a “progressive” tone which 
suggested the unlimited potential of the human being, even in the face of the 
capitalist giant,  
They are knowing—these mighty ones—in the affairs of the world, but in 
the things of the spirit they are like children. Knowledge they possess, but 
little wisdom. They do not understand the human soul. They underestimate 
the power of the ideal. They overlook the great longing—the terrible 
yearning—of the human heart, for truth and justice, liberty and joy and 
peace.43  
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Nearing’s vision of democracy placed knowledge and cooperation above gratuitous 
uses of power and privilege. In the context of war, the erosion of both democratic 
ideals and progressive notions of societal improvement appeared very real. Nearing 
seized on this fear with apocalyptic language, linking up socialist discourse with an 
image of America as a imperialist behemoth.  
The Wilson Administration sought to placate public alarm over the war with 
reassurances that the U.S. was in fact fighting to guarantee the preservation of 
international democracy. Of course, they maintained a slight advantage in keeping 
their message in front of the people. With control of the mail, the backing of 
industry and major media outlets, and the force of the Espionage and Sedition 
Acts, the government fastened a tight noose on the spread of disagreeable 
information. Additionally, the Committee on Public Information (CPI), the 
government’s aggressive war-boosting agency headed by former newspaperman 
George Creel, worked to drown opposition to Wilsonian doctrine. As Elizabeth 
McKillen suggests, the American Federation of Labor, under Gompers, also played 
an important part in suffocating radicals: “Gompers wore down his opponents 
through smear campaigns that questioned their patriotism and often linked them to 
German sabotage…he also had the power to deny his opponents any real voice in 
shaping AFL policy.”44 The President too, ultimately played a significant role in 
frustrating the efforts of socialists and pacifists. As the war passed through 1917, 
notes Arthur Link, “Wilson pressed his campaign for peace with mounting 
intensity…Again and again, he said that Americans had no quarrel with the great 
German people, admired their accomplishments, and, above all, coveted their 
friendship.”45 Wilson conveyed to Americans that the country’s only objective in 
waging war was to achieve peace. But as Link also points out, Wilson “took 
assiduous pains to make clear that the United States was in the war for its own 
reasons.”46 Socialists were at an advantage in this respect, as they found ways to 
exploit anything that smacked of aggrandizement.  
Statements communicated publicly by Wilson and the profits made by 
private business were monitored closely for any hint of duplicity. For example, 
Nearing, in an unpublished letter to The New York Times, questioned an 
advertisement that ran in that newspaper’s October 3, 1917 edition. Paid for by 
several major American industries in support of the Liberty Loan Committee, a key 
revenue generator for the war effort, the advertisement read: “Make the World Safe 
for Business.” Nearing, incensed, wrote, “what does that mean—‘Make the World 
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Safe for Business?’ It means huge red war profits…It means hell on earth so 
American business men can ‘get theirs’…That is what I have in mind when I 
accuse American business interests of using the world crisis as an occasion for 
making money.”47 He repeatedly made the case that profiting from war, indeed, 
supplying the tools for destruction and international chaos, contradicted not simply 
moral sensibilities, but liberal democratic ones too.    
Nearing especially hoped to expose Wilson’s liberal-internationalism as a 
ruse and a front for the ruling class to line their pockets at the expense of the small 
farmer and industrial laborer. Wilson had mostly jettisoned his “New Freedom” 
program of 1912, discarding the remnants of the “old principles,” to “embrace new 
ones as the price of retaining power” in 1916.48 The New Freedom, according to 
Link, more and more resembled Theodore Roosevelt’s “New Nationalism” of 
1912, which called on the federal government to fuel national initiatives for 
workers and farmers to gain a greater foothold in the rapidly expanding domestic 
and international economies. But Wilson found himself in the unenviable position 
of reconciling “illiberalism at home to reinforce the men at the front.”49 
Throughout 1918, Nearing tried to zero in on this contradiction, emphasizing that 
Wilson’s international aims came at the expense of the welfare of the American 
people. With the People’s Council severely limited by governmental repression 
and subject to constant mail screenings, and Nearing regularly in court for 
violating the Espionage Act (for writing The Great Madness), a new line of attack 
was needed. Nearing rallied the support of the radical community around his 
defense. He pointed out that not only were Americans suffering from class and 
economic oppression, but they were also victims of verbal and physical repression. 
Just as he had altered the direction of the pacifist movement earlier in the war 
through his persistent critique of American capitalism, he did so again on trial. 
Nearing came to symbolize the plight of the oppressed, and many of his 
supporters at the Rand School, students and intellectuals alike, as well as People’s 
Council members lobbied against the charge on his behalf. Just as the American 
declaration of war fragmented pacifists in 1917, the “Red Scare” threatened to 
crush radical sentiment in 1919, and with the conclusion of the war in November, 
radicals focused all of their energies on fighting persecution. Nearing’s trial 
became a national sensation, in part because he decided to defend himself, but also 
because of his popularity among working-class people. The New York Times 
followed the trial throughout 1918 until its conclusion in February 1919. Prior to 
Nearing’s final words in defense of his actions, the Times wrote, “it was a dramatic 
moment when Nearing, after reviewing in a glimpse his life work, paused and said, 
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‘I have done what I could.’ For the time being the matter is in your hands.”50 He 
was eventually acquitted on charges of violating the Espionage Act, but as he 
recalled in his memoirs, the experience only hardened his opinions about war, 
exploitation and repression:  
There is an old saying that truth is the first casualty in any war. From 
personal experience I can bear witness that war not only negates truth, 
decency, and human kindness, but brings disaster also to truth-seekers and 
those who are devoting their energies to social improvement. War is hell. 
More than that, war drags human beings from their tasks of building and 
improving, and pushes them en masse into the category of destroyers and 
killers.51 
     
The risks of evaluating a single historical figure during a short time frame 
seem self-evident: rarely does a person so affect a particular socio-cultural or 
political milieu as to warrant undivided attention to their life, and rarely does a 
person so transcend his or her own circumstances as to confer exceptional status to 
their achievements. However, the benefits quickly outweigh the risks in this case 
when one considers Nearing’s unique circumstances. In the span of a year, 
between the spring of 1916 and the spring of 1917, he moved from a prominent 
position in academia to a position on the front lines of “radical” anti-war activity. 
He lost his job, his social standing, and his credibility in the conventional world, 
but gained a preeminent position as a champion of human freedom in the Socialist 
Party. Although American socialism proved unsuccessful in its bid to overthrow 
the “hegemonic” forces of capitalism, Nearing succeeded on a wide-scale in 
challenging pacifists, workers, socialists, intellectuals, and students to think about 
the complicated questions that war posed for humanity. His legacy, then, resides 
not necessarily in the popularization of anti-establishment doctrine, but in his 
ability to transcend a moment, and to lead people in a new direction. The historian 
Howard Zinn wrote of World War I that, “the rhetoric of the socialists, that it was 
an ‘imperialist’s war,’ now seems moderate and hardly arguable.”52 However, that 
is only so because radicals like Scott Nearing helped Americans to better 
understand the pretenses under which the war was being fought.  
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